The Special Committee of the Board of Dell Inc. DELL today issued
the following letter to stockholders:
Dear Stockholders:
We are writing to update you regarding our evaluation of the various leveraged
recapitalization transactions that Carl Icahn has proposed, including the most
recent version put forth at the end of last week, and to make some
observations about leveraged recapitalizations more broadly.
The basic concept that Mr. Icahn has proposed would be a $15.6 billion
self-tender by the Company at a price for each share actually purchased of
$14. Mr. Icahn and Southeastern Asset Management would agree not to tender any
of their shares. On Friday, Mr. Icahn proposed that the tender price would
also include, for each four shares purchased, one warrant to purchase an
additional share at a $20 strike price. If these transactions were consummated
and all stockholders other than Mr. Icahn and Southeastern tendered, each
stockholder would be required to retain approximately 29% of his or her shares
in the highly leveraged public company that would result, and would receive
for each share held approximately $9.99 in cash and 0.18 warrants.
We have reviewed with our financial and legal advisors the risks and rewards
of Mr. Icahn's proposal, as well as the financing he has outlined for that
proposal.
At various points, Mr. Icahn has asked the Special Committee to declare the
transaction he has outlined a “Superior Proposal” under Dell's existing merger
agreement or to withdraw our recommendation in favor of the Michael
Dell/Silver Lake merger. In fact, however, he has not constructed his proposal
in a manner that makes that possible or appropriate. First, the financing he
has proposed cannot be accepted by us – it is expressly conditioned on the
election to the Dell board of all 12 nominees of Icahn and Southeastern.
Second, while he has asked us either to abandon the Michael Dell/Silver Lake
merger agreement or to make a recommendation change that would permit Mr. Dell
and Silver Lake to terminate that agreement, Mr. Icahn's proposal specifically
cautions that his transaction might never be completed and offers no remedies
in the event that he or his nominees or financing sources fail to consummate a
transaction. And third, he has identified neither a management team, nor a
strategic plan or vision, on the basis of which the Committee or anyone else
could evaluate the value of the “stub” equity he contemplates.
More broadly, based on analyses prepared by our advisors and our own view of
the business, we do not believe that Mr. Icahn's proposal is superior to the
certainty of value offered by a sale of the entire Company at $13.65 per
share. The addition of warrants to Mr. Icahn's concept has not meaningfully
altered the value equation: The warrants themselves would, according to the
analyses we have reviewed, be of modest value and that value would be offset
in part by their dilutive effect on the stub equity held by the recipient.
Further, on receipt, the entire value of the warrants would likely be taxable
to the holder. Finally, there is a fundamental illogic in ascribing meaningful
value to the transfer of a portion of any upside above $20 per share from
those who most believe in it (apparently Mr. Icahn and Southeastern) to those
who do not believe in it (the tendering stockholders who have sought to cash
out at $14 per share).
While for the foregoing reasons Mr. Icahn's proposal does not provide the
basis for the Committee to change its recommendation, we are mindful of the
fact that the Board could independently resolve to consummate various
leveraged recapitalization transactions – including one along the lines
outlined by Mr. Icahn – with or without an agreement by certain shareholders
like Mr. Icahn and Southeastern to roll over their shares. Throughout its
thorough, multi-month review process, the Special Committee has carefully
considered the possibility of various recapitalization transactions. We have
reviewed sources of financing for such a transaction, the credit parameters of
the Company following a substantial dividend or stock repurchase, and the
liquidity and market implications of various potential approaches.
To summarize, while the Company's strong balance sheet makes it possible to
borrow significant amounts, we consider it unwise to layer substantial
financial risk on a company already facing significant challenges from
competition and from the rapid pace of technological change. It is, we
believe, not an accident that no large publicly traded technology company
carries high levels of debt. And while we recognize that, as a private company
controlled by Mr. Dell and Silver Lake, the Company will have a significant
debt burden, the risks of that capital structure will be borne entirely by the
buyers and not by the public stockholders. Moreover, the buyers have the
financial resources to invest additional funds if that proves necessary.
Conversely, a leveraged recapitalization of the sort advocated by Mr. Icahn
would force Dell stockholders to maintain meaningful equity exposure to a
non-investment grade, publicly traded company that we believe would likely be
ill-prepared to weather further downturns in the PC business and could be
hamstrung in its ability to make the additional investments needed to complete
its transformational plan. We believe such a company would face instability
that would undermine customer confidence and make it harder to attract and
retain the best employees.
We have also evaluated alternative recapitalization transactions that involve
a stronger balance sheet and more modest returns of capital. These would not
pose the same risk to Dell's future, but, in our view, they also would not
fundamentally create value. Accordingly, we concluded, and we continue to
believe, that a sale at a premium remains a superior option to a leveraged
recapitalization.
In closing, we wish to note that it is unfortunate Mr. Icahn continues to
conduct his campaign by trying to discredit the Special Committee and accuse
it of frightening Dell stockholders. Such accusations do a disservice to all
of you. The Committee has studied a complicated situation with great care,
balanced risks and rewards in a dispassionate manner and concluded the
transaction you are being asked to vote for on July 18th is in the best
interests of stockholders. It would be irresponsible if we did not share with
all stockholders the reasons for our conclusions.
In addition, we have taken extraordinary measures to ensure Mr. Dell's
neutrality and to leave the final decision with the disinterested
stockholders. And for many months now, any party, including Mr. Icahn and
Southeastern, has had and continues to have the opportunity to purchase the
Company at a price higher than $13.65 a share. No such party has emerged.
We appreciate that different stockholders may have different views about the
alternatives facing the Company or different appetites for business and
financial risk. We encourage an open debate about these matters. But we urge
you to base your decision on the facts and not be misled by Mr. Icahn's
self-serving accusations.
The Special Committee has had only one goal from the beginning – and that is
to maximize value for stockholders, however that goal is best achieved. We
have studied the options very carefully and our conclusion, which has been
supported by all of the leading proxy advisory services, is that a sale
transaction at a substantial and certain premium is the best way forward. That
is why we urge you to vote the WHITE card promptly by telephone or internet in
support of receiving $13.65 per share in cash, and to be sure your vote is
received in time to be counted at Dell's Special Meeting to be held on
Thursday, July 18, 2013 at 8:00 a.m. CDT.
Shareholders who have any questions, require assistance in voting the WHITE
proxy card, or need additional copies of Dell's proxy materials are encouraged
to contact MacKenzie Partners toll-free at (800) 322-2885, or via email at
Dell@mackenziepartners.com.
Sincerely,
Alex J. Mandl
Janet F. Clark
Laura Conigliaro
Kenneth M. Duberstein
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF DELL INC.
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